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Corporate strategy, corporate capture: Food and 
alcohol industry lobbying and public health
Abstract
This article examines two industry sectors – those making and selling fast 
food and alcoholic beverages or associated products. We examine their 
role in influencing policy and decision making on the regulation of their 
products for health reasons. We argue that the food and alcohol industries 
engage in a very wide range of tactics and strategies to defend and indeed 
to promote their ‘licence to operate’. We focus in on a specific compo-
nent of these by examining public relations and lobbying strategies and 
their impacts on elite decision makers. We suggest that lobbying influ-
ence is a matter of both communication and action. We go on to outline 
the vertical and horizontal differentiation of lobbying strategies arguing 
that policy capture is the ultimate goal of lobbying, though influence is 
pursued by wide-ranging strategies to capture various arenas of decision 
making. We examine four key arenas; science, civil society, the media and 
policy, closing with an examination of two cases of the so-called ‘partner-
ship’ model of governance.
Key words:  alcohol industry, corporate power, food industry, lobbying, 
public relations
Introduction
This article examines the activities of the alcohol and food industries in 
attempting to resist meaningful progress on public health measures to 
tackle consumption related harms. We argue that lobbying is crucially 
important in this and that it is one of a variety of means that corpora-
tions have at their disposal to manage various social domains such as 
the media, science and civil society as well as most obviously policy. 
We argue that the management of these domains is a core function 
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of corporate strategy and that lobbying conceived broadly is one key 
means for corporations to attempt to exert power and control in vary-
ing social domains. Our argument builds on the work of Farnsworth 
and his colleagues who apply to social policy the well known distinc-
tion between structural power (the power of investment decisions) and 
the power of corporate agency (the pursuit of influence over policy 
and politics) (Farnsworth, 2004, 2006; Farnsworth and Holden, 2006; 
Holden and Lee, 2009). However, we take this further in arguing the 
need to see questions of influence in the context of communication. By 
this we mean that communication is intrinsic to influence and cannot 
be separated from action and agency. Indeed we see the two as funda-
mentally connected by interests. This provides an approach that moves 
beyond traditional ‘power structure’ research.
To understand how influence works we draw upon work on the 
emergence of the neoliberal ‘thought-collective’ (Mirowski and Plehwe, 
2009). This differs from previous accounts in that it explicitly incorpo-
rates ideas as well as structure in questions of ‘influence’. However, we 
go beyond this in focusing on the practical role of ideas via communi-
cation, the concept which links structure with ideas and influence: in 
a phrase ‘communicative agency’ – a notion that undercuts poststruc-
turalist and ‘discursive’ approaches and which ensures that ideas and 
communication take their proper intrinsic role in the analysis of power 
and legitimation as opposed to being tacked on or fore-grounded at 
the expense of both structural power and extra discursive action. We 
argue that focusing on the communicative agency involved is a valu-
able corrective to those approaches tending to emphasize only structure 
or ‘discourse’. Our concept draws on elements of Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, specifically the notion that communication and 
debate are crucial (Habermas, 1984, 1987). However, it recognizes the 
limitations of the concept as applied to actually existing capitalism in 
which the basic consensus model envisaged by Habermas is crucially 
undermined by inequalities of communicative resources in the context 
of hegemonic processes – by ideological dissensus.
In our view lobbying is a matter of communicative agency as opposed 
to a matter of structural power, influence or ‘discourse’ and we discuss it 
in these terms throughout the article. Lobbying is an important dimen-
sion of policy processes in the UK and other Western nations, though it 
can often be ignored in the literature on policy and indeed in the wider 
social science literature. While there is an extensive literature on lobby-
ing or ‘interest representation’, the communicative aspect of lobbying is 
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often missing. For us lobbying (and public relations) are fundamentally 
matters of communicative agency. Our account of lobbying empha-
sizes corporate strategy and its coherence (though obviously there are 
often internal tensions within corporations). Though we concentrate on 
a specific set of tactics in this article, we always see these in the wider 
context of overall corporate strategy, which, we argue, is the best way 
to understand corporate agency and consequently power. In this paper 
we suggest that the significance of communicative agency is illustrated 
by the empirical evidence that corporations actively engage in attempt-
ing to dominate the information environment, so they can significantly 
affect decision making. We refer to this as capture, but it is important 
to understand that this is a question not only of ‘policy’ capture but of 
capturing a wide range of arenas of debate and decision making either 
because these are seen as intrinsically important or because they are use-
ful for activities in other arenas (see Miller and Mooney, this volume).
Food and alcohol
We have chosen to focus on food and alcohol, for two main reasons. 
Firstly because they are both issues with strong science based compo-
nents and this allows us to illustrate the importance of the management 
of science in social policy; secondly because they are a strong and grow-
ing focus for policy discussions at a range of levels, from the national to 
the global (Nestle, 2003; Hawkes, 2006).
Taking the example of food and obesity first we can note that in 
2004 the World Health Organisation announced that the scale of obes-
ity worldwide meant that it had overtaken hunger as the world’s prin-
cipal nutritional problem, even in some developing countries (WHO, 
2004). Adult onset diabetes has been renamed type two diabetes because 
it no longer just affects adults, children as young as eight are being 
diagnosed with the condition (Brownell and Warner, 2009). In the 
UK the Department of Health states: ‘Rising levels of obesity in the 
UK mean that 90 per cent of today’s children will be overweight and at 
risk from serious diseases by 2050, costing the NHS an estimated £50 
billion’ (Nicholson, 2009: 12).
WHO figures show that alcohol over-consumption is a significant 
public health problem in Europe; it is the third biggest killer after 
tobacco and hypertension, one in ten deaths are attributable to alcohol in 
Europe (Anderson and Baumberg, 2006). Young people are particularly 
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vulnerable with one in four deaths in males aged 15–29 years in Europe 
attributable to alcohol and 55,000 young people dying as a result of 
alcohol in 1999 (Anderson and Baumberg, 2006; Beaglehole and Bonita, 
2009; Rhem et al., 2004, 2009).
Alcohol and food share a number of similarities as issues but it is 
also clear that there are differences. First it can be noted that alcohol is 
similar to tobacco in that it is harmful to health and is also subject to 
regulations regarding its sale and distribution. There are social benefits 
to consuming alcohol that differentiate it from tobacco and tobacco has 
been stigmatized in a way that alcohol and food cannot be. Food is easily 
distinguished from tobacco and alcohol as an essential part of nutrition. 
Although a growing area of concern in social policy circles, it is not sub-
ject to control policies in the same way alcohol and tobacco are. What 
each of the three has in common is that the industries that produce 
alcohol, tobacco and junk food blame the consumer and their individual 
choices for any adverse health effects resulting from consumption.
There are specific issues in understanding how alcohol and food risks 
are dealt with in comparison to other issues. However, it is our conten-
tion that the model of the interaction between business and social policy 
that we outline applies equally well to other areas of social policy.
Neoliberalism, globalization and levels of governance
Corporate led globalization has resulted in more stratified decision 
making both devolving it down and coordinating it up. The neolib-
eral era ushers in a new political geography of governance. This does 
not necessarily mean that the nation state has ‘lost’ power, but rather 
that the venues of decision making have diversified (Kooiman, 1999; 
Rhodes, 2000). Consequently it is no longer enough to take the nation 
state as the primary or only unit of analysis. We need to pay close 
attention to the vertical differentiation of corporate agency at the local, 
national and supranational level. Stratification occurs horizontally as 
well, so that decision making and power flow out from the state to pri-
vate actors. Private actors (and some others) are invited into the state to 
make policy. It is no longer enough to think about corporations only as 
attempting to influence policy. In reality much decision-making power 
has been directly devolved to them while corporations are increasingly 
‘internal’ to the state. We will explore this in some detail towards the 
end of this article in taking two cases of ‘partnership’ governance.
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At each level of governance, lobbyists attempt to influence decisions 
by capturing policy processes and outcomes. This is a sort of ‘institu-
tional corruption’ variously described as ‘market-driven politics’ or as 
‘post-democracy’ (Leys, 2001; Crouch, 2004). The lobbyists make sure 
to secure and capitalize on favourable assumptions by offering incen-
tives in the form of travel and hospitality, paid and unpaid advisory 
positions, and – the big prize – board memberships once politicians and 
senior civil servants leave public service. This phenomenon is so well 
known that a term has been invented to describe it – the revolving door. 
Institutional corruption is not the term used by theorists of governance 
though they do discuss the rise of the ‘unelected’ in policy making – a 
development of which writers such as Vibert (2006) approve. We see 
this as symptomatic of what Janine Wedel has called ‘flex networks’, 
a new development whereby the entanglement of public and private 
sectors leads to the breakdown of notions of ethical behaviour and the 
collapse of the ability to police such standards as exist (Wedel, 2009).
Strategy: Corporate capture
In order to deal with the stratification of decision making the largest 
corporations organize at each venue of decision making. They maintain 
or fund a complex and ever changing network of lobby groups, policy 
planning organizations, front groups, institutes, science based initia-
tives and think tanks. We have included a number of think tanks and 
science oriented organizations which may appear on the surface to be 
independent but in reality are vehicles for corporate influence, being 
funded mostly or exclusively by big business and performing varying 
roles for the corporations.
These can be thought of as both vertically and horizontally differen-
tiated and an indicative range is illustrated in Table 1. In reality the pic-
ture is much more complex in that there are many more organizations 
than we show and that many have more than one function or operate at 
more than one level of governance. For example, though we only show it 
at the ‘Scottish’ level, the Scotch Whisky Association is a powerful actor 
at the UK and EU levels as well. The table reveals firstly that corporate 
interests are organized at every level of governance in a myriad of ways.
The targeting of decision making in Scotland is often coordinated 
by Scottish based or at least Scottish titled groups and the same goes for 
the UK (Statal) level and on up to the global forums of governance. 
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Table 1  Vertical and horizontal corporate avenues of influence
Level of 
governance / 
Arena of focus
Scottish UK EU Global
Parliamentary 
groups
Scottish 
Parliament 
and Business 
Exchange
All-Party Beer 
Group 
European 
Parliament 
policy discussion 
groups
n/a
Cross Party 
Groups
All-Party 
Whisky and 
Spirits Group
Industry and 
Parliament 
Trust
Trade  
association
Scotch 
Whisky 
Association
Scotch 
Whisky 
Association
European 
Association of 
Communication 
Agencies
Snack Food 
Association
Scottish 
Retail 
Consortium
Advertising 
Association
Brewers of 
Europe
Global 
Alcohol 
Producers 
Group
Food & Drink 
Federation
Classwide  
lobby group
Scottish CBI Confederation 
of British 
Industry
European 
Roundtable of 
Industrialists
World 
Business 
Council for 
Sustainable 
Development
Lobby groups Scottish Beer 
and Pub 
Association
The Portman 
Group
European Food 
Information 
Council
International 
Food 
Information 
Council
Science 
related
n/a British 
Nutrition 
Foundation
Weinberg 
Group
International 
Life Sciences 
Institute
Landmark 
Europe
World Sugar 
Research 
Organization
Think tank International 
Futures 
Forum
Policy 
Exchange
Centre for the 
New Europe
ICAP 
(International 
Center for 
Alcohol 
Policies)
 M I L L E R  &  H A R K I N S — C O R P O R A T E  S T R A T E G Y  7
Horizontal integration and differentiation is shown by the spread of 
organizations with differing functions either representing differing 
corporations or industrial sectors or orienting towards varying arenas in 
society whether that be the parliamentary arena or science, the media, 
civil society etc. The organizations are also variegated by type includ-
ing think tanks and trade associations, science related and front groups 
as well as partnership organizations. Table 1 also indicates that not all 
possible arenas are targeted. For example there are no parliamentary 
focused bodies at the global level, since there is no global parliament.
Direct and indirect methods
Lobbyists are ultimately interested in changing or maintaining 
policies. But that does not mean that they therefore only target the 
policy community for capture. On the contrary it is important to 
note that lobbyists operate to capture a wide range of arenas in addi-
tion which they hope and intend to use to capture policy. For our 
purposes we can examine science capture, civil society capture and 
media capture, though we could equally examine the capture of the 
legal process or education or other areas of society. Each of these 
Level of 
governance / 
Arena of focus
Scottish UK EU Global
Scottish 
Council 
Foundation
Adam Smith 
Institute
Democracy 
Institute
Media  
influence
n/a Science Media 
Centre
n/a n/a
Social Issues 
Research 
Centre
Drinkaware European 
Alcohol and 
Health Forum
Note: All these bodies are (at least in part) funded or supported by the alcohol and fast food/obesity 
industry. Supporting documentation on each of these organizations as avenues of corporate influence (as 
opposed to disinterested actors) is available at www.powerbase.info
Table 1  (Continued)
8 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 0 ( 4 )
has as its ultimate aim the capture of decision making. Direct policy 
capture is an important strategy, but indirect methods are also 
increasingly of use.
Science capture
Capturing scientific expertise is a key objective for lobbyists. The 
tobacco industry successfully muddied the waters about the health 
effects of tobacco for thirty years (Holden and Lee, 2009). Similar tactics 
are currently being used by the food and alcohol industries. Attempts 
to capture science by corporate interests in general are increasingly well 
documented (Krimsky, 1995; Mooney, 2006; McGarrity and Wagner, 
2008; Michaels, 2008; Wiist, 2010). Such strategies involve more than 
‘spinning’ science and encompass very wide-ranging attempts to skew 
the scientific evidence base and to manage the whole scientific enter-
prise. McGarrity and Wagner (2008: 10) describe the ‘tools for bend-
ing science’ as ‘shaping, hiding, attacking, harassing, packaging and 
spinning’ – tools that encompass the entire range of scientific process. 
Given the extensive literature in this area we do not go in to more 
detail on this here save to indicate that science as an activity crosses 
all three spheres of society outlined in Figure 1 in the introduction to 
this volume (Miller and Mooney, 2010), playing a key role inside the 
corporation, in civil society and in government.
If the science cannot be captured, the strategy is likely to be to cre-
ate uncertainty to block meaningful policy change (Michaels, 2008). 
The point is that this is done as a means of influencing opinion and 
decision making across varying domains. Thus while policy may be the 
ultimate goal, preparing and defending a particular line using managed 
science can also affect media and public discussion and constrain the 
views and activities of civil society groups. Alternatively the product of 
‘bent’ science can also be used by those elements of civil society used by 
the corporations to dominate the information environment.
Civil society capture
Capturing civil society is also part of corporate strategy. Separate from 
the market and the state, civil society includes charities, non-governmental 
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organizations, trades unions, social movements, business associations 
and other groups (Centre for Civil Society, n.d.). While there is some 
debate about the precise limits of civil society (Edwards, 2005) we do 
not include bodies that are under the direct and open control of business, 
only those that are not, or claim not to be, under direct control. This 
is obviously not a matter of a clear dividing line but rather a moveable 
scale. This is important since one of the oldest corporate techniques is 
the creation of front groups – organizations claiming to be independ-
ent but actually controlled by corporations (Miller and Dinan, 2008). 
In practice much work on civil society leaves out the inconvenient case 
of corporate involvement in civil society.
The use of fake citizen groups – so-called ‘astroturf’ organizations – is a 
key technique. These appear to be genuine charitable organizations set up 
by or in the interests of ordinary citizens. In reality they may exist solely 
or mainly for particular policy purposes. One such organization unearthed 
in our research was The Obesity Awareness and Solutions Trust:
The Obesity Awareness and Solutions Trust (Toast) boasted about caus-
ing an influential parliamentary inquiry into obesity while failing to 
declare its financial links to the weight-loss industry. Toast also used a 
Westminster lobbying firm to ‘acquire’ a large group of ‘parliamentary 
patrons’. (Gillard, 2008)
Some of the patrons claimed that they had not been informed about the 
links with the diet firm:
Conservative MP David Amess, a key Toast supporter, lobbied colleagues 
on the Health Select Committee to hold an inquiry into obesity . . . Mr 
Amess admits he had not carried out checks before acting for Toast and 
says he feels he was ‘conned’. (Gillard, 2008)
TOAST was formally wound up in 2008, but is not an isolated example 
in the sense that it was part of a continuing dense network of organiza-
tions attempting to play a role in obesity policy. Not all of these are 
‘front’ groups in the same way as TOAST, largely because each organi-
zation has its own modus operandi and overall function.
For example three of TOAST’s parliamentary patrons were mem-
bers of the Health Select Committee when it investigated obesity in 
2004 and most of the rest were involved in cross-party groups on health 
related issues, many of which are funded by the corporations. These 
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in turn have multiple connections to the corporations. Tracing from 
TOAST we find that its PR company, the Whitehouse Consultancy, 
has a range of other obesity related companies amongst its clients. Its 
director Christopher Whitehouse is also a director of a company called 
Westminster Forum Projects which runs the Westminster Food and 
Nutrition Forum, a body which also boasts a long list of parliamentary 
patrons including many of those associated with TOAST. A similar 
list of patrons is to be found at the Associate Parliamentary Health 
Group which is run by a further lobbying firm called Policy Connect. 
Baroness Julia Cumberledge, one of the patrons of the APHG, herself 
runs a lobby firm (Cumberledge Connections) which for a time was 
controversially based in her office in the House of Lords (Hencke and 
Evans, 2009). Among the corporations funding the APHG are Abbott 
Laboratories, Alliance Boots, Astra Zeneca, BUPA, GlaxoSmithKline, 
Pfizer, SanofiAventis, Schering Plough and Wyeth (Associate Parlia-
mentary Health Group, 2010). These interlocking connections – which 
we only hint at here – show the myriad ways in which corporate inter-
ests attempt to dominate and colonize the information environment 
around the legislature specifically.
Other seemingly disinterested groupings in civil society can have 
similar links, often undisclosed. For example the rise of think tanks is 
a key way in which mostly corporate money (in the UK) is channelled 
into apparently disinterested or non-partisan organizations that are said 
to provide a bridge between knowledge and policy. There is not space to 
look at this in detail here (though see Ruane, this volume for a discussion), 
but it can be noted that seen from the perspective of the corporations, 
the distinction between a front group, a policy discussion forum and a 
think tank is more a question of targeting and strategy than location at 
some point on the scale of ‘independence’. Take the example of Pfizer, the 
US based pharmaceutical corporation that funds the APHG. Pfizer has 
made it a priority to fund and to create think tanks all over the world. 
Former Reagan administration official, Catherine Windels, was in charge 
of ‘Worldwide Policy Mobilization’. In which role she reportedly ‘helped 
create new think tanks and networks of think tanks in Europe, Canada, 
Africa and Asia, as well as . . . in the US’ (cited in Powerbase, 2010).
By these means corporations are able to populate the information 
environment with a wide variety of seemingly independent and uncon-
nected organizations that have the advantage of uttering messages con-
sonant with corporate interests. Of course the information environment 
is not the only game in town.
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Media capture
The capture of the media is important as it provides an opportunity to 
connect with popular opinion as well as elite opinion and can help in 
attempts to target and destroy critics. This is important because the 
media can play a direct role in lobbying and policy making, while also 
mediating popular concerns.
The full range of mechanisms by which the media are ‘captured’ 
by the corporations is well known in academic work on media institu-
tions and processes. Any such account includes the influence of media 
ownership, advertising, public relations and spin, attacking critics and – 
at least in some models – the question of ideology. We do not dissent 
for these models which – Marxist or liberal – are largely agreed on the 
mechanisms, if varying in their emphasis and theoretical frameworks 
(McChesney, 2008). To those models we would add the use and role 
of the media in securing policy capture, and in particular the sophis-
ticated use of seemingly independent organizations which perform a 
public relations role for industry at one remove. This is a neglected 
field in media studies, as well as in social policy (Miller and Dinan, 
2009). Capturing the media is done by both traditional means such as 
the use of apparently independent organizations set up to target the 
media as well as newer attempts to directly take over the means of 
communication.
One example of the former is the Social Issues Research Centre 
(SIRC), an ‘independent, non-profit organisation’ that says it carries 
out ‘balanced, calm and thoughtful’ research on lifestyle issues such 
as drinking, diet, and pharmaceuticals. However, it may be perceived 
that the company acts more like a public relations agency for the cor-
porations that fund its activities. These include Diageo, Flora, Coca-
Cola, GlaxoSmithKline, and Roche, among others. Although SIRC 
does publish this partial list of funders, it is not immediately apparent 
which company has sponsored which study and in some instances this 
information is not included in media reports (cited in Miller and De 
Andrade, 2010).
SIRC is sceptical that there is such a thing as an obesity ‘epidemic’, 
which fits with the interests of funders such as Coca-Cola, Cadbury 
Schweppes, Masterfoods, and the Sugar Bureau. It has coined the term 
‘riskfactorphobia’ to suggest that we are too averse to risk, which fits 
the interests of the food companies as well as the raft of alcohol firms 
for which SIRC works. None of the reports mentioned in the foregoing 
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paragraph contain information about the source of funding, so it is 
difficult to tell how ‘clients’ feed into particular activities. In some cases 
SIRC does say which corporation has sponsored its reports. Tio Pepe, 
a drinks company, funded one on dinner parties; and pub chain owner 
Greene King on ‘the local’ (Miller and De Andrade, 2010).
Although SIRC’s publicity material regularly uses the term ‘social 
scientists’ to refer to its own staff, it uses the same personnel and office 
as a commercial market research company, MCM Research. SIRC’s co-
directors, Peter Marsh and Kate Fox, work for both organizations. The 
MCM website used to ask: ‘Do your PR initiatives sometimes look too 
much like PR initiatives? MCM conducts social/psychological research 
on the positive aspects of your business. The results do not read like PR 
literature, or like market research data. Our reports are credible, inter-
esting and entertaining in their own right. This is why they capture the 
imagination of the media and your customers’ (cited in Ferriman, 1999).
Recently, however, MCM has taken a lower profile. Its website now 
redirects to that of SIRC, and visitors are informed that the centre ‘has 
now taken over the task of hosting and publishing reports and materi-
als conducted under the MCM Research name’ (cited in Miller and De 
Andrade, 2010).
Still, SIRC is taken seriously by some in government. It was recently 
commissioned to produce two independent reviews for an investigation 
by the Department for Children, Schools and Families of the commer-
cialization of childhood. The reports, published in late 2009, oppose 
a public health approach that is based on population level measures, 
including the restriction of advertising or marketing. The conclusion 
that SIRC reached is that ‘the issues involved are very much more 
complex’ – a position consistent with that advanced by elements of the 
food and advertising industries (cited in Miller and De Andrade, 2010). 
This nicely illustrates the multiple role of organizations like SIRC: to 
become trusted sources for both media and policy.
It is important for the corporations to try to exert maximum mes-
sage control while at the same time appearing to be subject to the 
vagaries of ‘independent’ media. As a result, in recent years the media 
and the internet have become important resources in lobbying cam-
paigns. So much so that one US PR and lobbying firm has invented 
what has been called ‘journo-lobbying’ (Confessore, 2003; Miller and 
Dinan, 2008). One pioneering example is Tech Central Station which 
appears at first glance to be a kind of think tank cum internet magazine. 
Look a little deeper and it is apparent that TCS has ‘taken aggressive 
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positions on one side or another of intra-industry debates, rather like a 
corporate lobbyist’ (Confessore, 2003).
‘But’, writes Nicholas Confessore, ‘TCS doesn’t just act like a lob-
bying shop. It’s actually published by one – the DCI Group, a promi-
nent Washington “public affairs” firm specializing in P.R., lobbying, 
and so-called “Astroturf”’. Clients have included McDonald’s and 
Coca-Cola. The two organizations ‘share most of the same owners, some 
staff, and even the same suite of offices in downtown Washington, a 
block off K Street . . . TCS not only runs the sponsors’ banner ads; its 
contributors aggressively defend those firms’ policy positions, on TCS 
and elsewhere’ (Confessore, 2003).
Journo-lobbying is ‘an innovation’, notes Confessore
driven primarily by the influence industry. Lobbying firms that once spe-
cialized in gaining person-to-person access to key decision-makers have 
branched out. The new game is to dominate the entire intellectual envi-
ronment in which officials make policy decisions, which means funding 
everything from think tanks to issue ads to phony grassroots pressure 
groups. But the institution that most affects the intellectual atmosphere 
in Washington, the media, has also proven the hardest for K Street to 
influence – until now. (Confessore, 2003)
This blurring of the line between journalism and lobbying is central to 
the contemporary use of the traditional media, but is obviously given 
a significant boost by the birth of the internet and especially Web 2.0 
techniques.
Policy capture
We have suggested that the attempt to capture varying arenas of 
debate and decision can be analysed separately as we have tried to do 
here. But, of course, as we noted at the beginning, separating them, 
while analytically useful is by no means a tidy process. The very 
extensive engagement of the corporations with science is intended 
to enable them to use science as a resource in policy capture. The 
media are engaged with to protect the flank and to push forward 
particular wider interests or attack critics. Civil society is a means 
for the corporations to see off the opposition of activist groups and 
the trades unions.
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Policy capture of one sort or another is the ultimate aim of all the 
strategies outlined here and many others. As we have noted this can be 
done directly or indirectly. The most obvious way in which corpora-
tions directly pursue their interests is via interaction with policy makers 
either on their own account or via heavyweight ‘trade associations’. These 
are largely sectoral associations such as the Food and Drink Federation, 
which represents most UK active firms engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of food and beverages. The FDF hired lobbying and PR firm Bell 
Pottinger in early 2006 to add to their other PR efforts ‘focusing initially 
on vending, food labelling and advertising to children’. ‘The temperature 
has risen’, said Bell Pottinger director Kevin Read. ‘Food and drink is 
now a major social issue. People talk about it in the pub.’ FDF deputy 
director-general, Martin Paterson, added ‘We’re cranking up PR activ-
ity,’ he says. ‘Our arguments need to be heard’ (Quainton, 2006).
Only days later the industry scored a victory on salt when the Food 
Standards Agency revised its own targets upwards. Although it had 
‘previously declared a wish to cut the overall daily salt intake from 10g 
to 6g per person within four years, campaign groups argued that the 
revised targets would effectively raise recommended salt consumption 
to 8g a day’. The new targets were quickly welcomed by the FDF, as 
‘more realistic’. Consensus Action on Salt and Health accused the FSA 
of bowing to the industry’s ‘purely commercial interests’ after an intense 
lobbying campaign (Rowan, 2006). Such decisions reflect the difficult 
balancing act of an organization set up to ‘restore consumer confidence’ – 
a phrase which has a dual meaning. For the public it was supposed to 
mean a new agency on the side of the consumer. For the government 
and industry, meanwhile, it also means that the agency will perform a 
strategic role in managing public perceptions. This tightrope is mir-
rored inside the agency where many of the staff have a commitment to 
public health and independence from government, while at the same 
time the people put in charge of the agency are strongly linked to indus-
try. Deirdre Hutton, the chair of the FSA from July 2005, had shares in 
GlaxoSmithKline, Tesco and Unilever. Her replacement, Jeff Rooker, a 
Labour member of the House of Lords stepped down as the president of 
the Royal Association for British Dairy Farmers, to take up the FSA job. 
Eight of the thirteen board members also have some connection to the 
food or farming industries. Currently (in mid 2010) it has not a single 
board member with any experience in a public interest campaigning 
organization (Food Standards Agency, 2010). This account of regula-
tory agencies suggests that the corporate strategy to attempt to capture 
policy may often be successful at both a structural and practical level.
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Partnership governance in the UK
The involvement of unelected partners in the delivery of policy is an 
increasing facet of social policy at all levels of governance. We take 
two UK examples below, but there are similar experiences elsewhere. 
A 2004 Australian study examined a partnership between Alcohol 
Education Australia and the alcohol industry: the findings upheld the 
argument that such partnerships are more beneficial to the corporate 
sponsor than to any public health objectives. It also found that main-
taining an ‘uncompromising public health orientation’ was difficult 
when in partnership with the alcohol industry (Munro, 2004). In Scot-
land the implementation of the Partnership Agreement between the 
alcohol industry and the Scottish government was led by an official 
seconded in to the civil service from his day job as a lobbyist for Diageo 
(Smith, 2007). Alcohol policy in the EU is taken forward by the Euro-
pean Alcohol and Health Forum, composed of NGOs and the alcohol, 
advertising and sponsorship industries, though dominated by commer-
cial interests (Eurocare, 2007). It was modelled on the obesity policy 
vehicle the EU Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, whose 
membership consists of industry, public health NGOs and the Euro-
pean Commission and again is dominated by corporate interests. At the 
global level a similar picture is evident with the UN Global Compact 
being a partnership scheme between the United Nations and leading 
transnational corporations.
Obesity and Change4Life
Change4Life, launched in January 2009, is the Department of Health 
(DoH) anti-obesity marketing campaign.1 Described as an ‘evidence 
based’ marketing programme it will help ‘parents in making changes 
to their children’s diet and levels of physical activity’ (Department of 
Health, 2008a: ix).
Change4Life had been on the agenda since the government’s Choosing 
Health White Paper published in 2004 (Department of Health, 2004). 
The paper called for the development of a joint industry and government 
fund for promotional campaigns (Department of Health, 2004: 6). But, 
according to documents released under Freedom of Information legisla-
tion, six months before the Choosing Health paper was published a coalition 
of industry representatives approached the government with a blueprint 
for a campaign that resembled the Change4Life project (Advertising 
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Association et al., 2004). In 2008 the coalition reported that over 100 
companies coordinated by the Advertising Association’s Business4Life 
group would put up an ‘in-kind’ contribution of £200 million ‘media 
equivalent value’ (Whitehall Pages, 2008). The government provided £75 
million of real cash from the £372 million obesity budget (Department 
of Health, 2008).
All of the £75 million was paid to M&C Saatchi, which won the 
advertising contract to promote Change4Life (M&C Saatchi, 2010). In 
addition an associated PR contract was awarded to Freud Communi-
cations. Both contracts revealed the myriad connections, conflicts of 
interest and permeability of the boundaries between the private and 
public sectors. The Saatchi contract decision was the responsibility of 
Andrew Brent, then director of marketing within the DoH. Previously 
a marketing executive with Boots and Burger King, Brent left the DoH 
after only five months to work for Business4Life member BSkyB. The 
DoH stated that Brent had taken the post on the understanding that he 
would run preparations for the anti-obesity campaign until he found a 
private sector job (Benady, 2008).
There are further overlaps at Freud Communications, whose cli-
ents include Mars, Nestlé and PepsiCo (all members of Business4Life) 
(Freud Communications, 2010). The ubiquitous Matthew Freud is son-
in-law of Rupert Murdoch (Harris, 2008), whose BSkyB is both a Freud 
client and Business4Life member (Freud Communications, n.d.; Busi-
ness4Life, n.d.). Other connections include Freud’s Deputy Chairman, 
Lord (Philip) Gould of Brookwood, prominent architect of New Labour 
(Marriott, 2007). He is also an advisor to Freud client, PepsiCo, sit-
ting alongside former Health Secretary, Alan Milburn MP (BBC News, 
2006), on its nutritional board (Register of Lords’ Interests, 2010).
Such connections raised eyebrows when Freud won the contract as 
two other agencies pitching for the contract were told they were elimi-
nated from the running because of the fast food clients on their books 
(Cartnell, 2008; Farey-Jones, 2009). In 2009 Freud bought a 3.3% 
share in M&C Saatchi (Griffin, 2009).
But what of the ‘in-kind’ corporate contribution? This support has 
manifested itself in a variety of forms, with Kellogg’s expanding its 
Breakfast Clubs programme under the title of Breakfast4Life (Business-
4Life, n.d.) while, at the same time, encouraging children to eat Coco 
Pops (containing 30 g of sugar per 100 g serving) for breakfast and after 
school (Hickman, 2010). Meanwhile PepsiCo continues to promote its 
main fizzy drink (41 g of sugar per 340 g serving; eConsultant, n.d.) 
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by associating it with the very football stars it uses to endorse the 
Change4Life campaign (PepsiCo, 2010a, 2010b). It is not clear, in the 
end, if the companies are promoting the Change4Life message or if 
Change4Life is promoting brand awareness for the food companies.
A key criticism of Change4Life is that there are no obvious crite-
ria on which corporations could be excluded, even on the basis of bad 
practice. As Sustain spokesperson Jeanette Longfield commented, ‘If 
you don’t have any criteria for entry you completely debase the cur-
rency’ (Cooper, 2008). Sustain supports the traffic light scheme on food 
labelling, arguing that it is preferred and understood by consumers. 
The food industry has a long history of undermining the traffic light 
scheme, winning victory in early 2010 (Hickman, 2010). The traffic 
light system is a voluntary UK food labelling code supported by the 
FSA. Levels of salt, sugars and fats are illustrated by traffic light colours 
(FSA, n.d.). Industry involvement in Change4Life provides a means to 
appeal to policy makers and contributes to brand awareness. Both help 
avoid binding regulation.
Drinkaware Trust
A similar picture is evident in the development of the Drinkaware 
Trust, which says that it ‘promotes responsible drinking’ and attempts 
to ‘reduce alcohol misuse and minimise alcohol-related harm’ (Drinka-
ware Trust, 2010a). The Trust was designed to provide a platform for 
alcohol education that was independent from the alcohol industry. Yet 
today it is based inside the headquarters of the Portman Group, the big 
alcohol lobby group (Harkins, 2010).
The Trust was established in late 2006 as part of the 2004 Alcohol 
Strategy for England (Cabinet Office, 2004) which advocated establish-
ing a new independent national fund to support a reduction in alcohol 
harm. The Portman Group was against this and keen to run the fund 
itself (Baggott, 2006). Negotiations between industry and government 
resulted in the compromise that the Portman Group’s charitable activi-
ties, which since 2004 had been conducted through their Drinkaware 
website, would be rebranded and given greater independence (Scottish 
Government, 2006).
The Trust is funded entirely by the alcohol industry (including 
several supermarkets). The industry pledged an annual budget of at 
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least £5 million by the Trust’s third year. However, by their own 
account, between 2007 and 2009 the industry had contributed a total 
of £2,690,176 (Drinkaware Trust, 2010b). The funding shortfall is sig-
nificant, especially when compared to the £800 million spent annually 
in the UK on promoting alcohol (Hastings and Angus, 2009), in a 
market worth around £33.7 billion in 2007 (Nielsen, 2008). Although, 
in June 2009, the Trust appointed Professor Paul Wallace (Professor 
of Primary Care at University College London, and a general medi-
cal practitioner) as its medical adviser, Drinkaware presents a view of 
alcohol and its abuse consistent with the alcohol industry’s philosophy 
(Drinkaware Trust, 2009).
It focuses its prevention work on educational activities, an approach 
found consistently to be the least effective lever in controlling alco-
hol consumption and subsequent harm (Babor et al., 2003). This is as 
opposed to taking a population based approach and adopting tighter 
regulation of alcohol (Babor et al., 2003). The Trust shares the view 
of the alcohol industry that the majority of people drink responsibly 
(Drinkaware Trust, 2010c) – despite alarming increases in rates of 
alcohol related harm and figures that show alcohol related harm is not 
particular to certain groups, but evident across the board (Academy of 
Medical Sciences, 2004; Donaldson, 2008; Meier et al., 2009). In Scot-
land, for example, Nielson data show that if the Scottish population 
were to consume alcohol within the UK government guidelines, there 
would be a reduction of around a quarter of alcohol sales in Scotland 
(worth around £900 million) (Nielsen, 2008).
Educational campaigns have been found to be the least effective 
means of reducing alcohol related harm (Babor et al., 2003). Industry-
funded campaigns have been found to be the least effective of all. 
When tobacco conglomerate Philip Morris designed and funded televi-
sion campaigns in America to discourage youths from using tobacco, 
research found that their efforts may have actually encouraged children 
to smoke (Sebrie and Glantz, 2007; Wakefield et al., 2006). Independ-
ently funded campaigns, in contrast, were found to be more effective 
(Hyland et al., 2006; Warner, 2006).
Commenting on a 2009 Drinkaware campaign ‘Why let good 
times go bad?’ targeting binge drinkers aged 18–24, Don Shenker, 
chief executive of Alcohol Concern, stated: ‘This new initiative appears 
to be yet another example of the drinks industry trying desperately to 
avoid mandatory legislation to pass on health information to consumers’ 
(BBC News, 2009).
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Partnership working in other words promotes the erosion of barriers 
between government and the private sectors and makes the pursuit of 
social objectives harder because of the difficulty of taking decisions 
based on grounds of public health, social need or other social priorities.
Conclusions
Corporations seek to dominate the information and decision-making 
environment to pursue their interests. Such strategies are not always suc-
cessful, but they certainly are comprehensively and consciously planned.
The examples we focus on here both relate to public health and the 
question of implementing public health measures. To be successful of 
course public health measures also need to be integrated with a range 
of other policy areas including education, and the provision of social 
services. But our wider point is that corporations use lobbying strate-
gies in all areas of social policy. These, we argue are not add-ons or 
somehow separate from the rest of the activities of the corporations, but 
integrated and centrally directed, even if corporations themselves can 
be internally fractured over particular dimensions of strategy.
Public relations and lobbying activities have become more impor-
tant in the neoliberal period as more space has been opened up for pri-
vate sector engagement in policy creation and delivery. As a result we 
see qualitatively new sorts of governance emerge as the line between 
private and public sectors becomes more permeable. The advent of ‘part-
nership’ governance where public policy is not simply ‘influenced’ but 
is actually co-created and delivered by the private sector, indicates the 
increasingly shaky grip of concepts of governance developed before neo-
liberalism. This is why it is useful to turn to concepts such as that of the 
‘flex network’ as developed by the anthropologist Janine Wedel (2009).
We argue that flex networks and partnership governance are a con-
sequence of neoliberal modes of governance in social policy and that 
they indicate the central importance of corporate strategy in the crea-
tion and delivery of social policy. Our approach also insists that govern-
ance is a matter not simply of power or struggle but of communication, 
ideas and ideology. Lobbying and PR are fundamentally questions of 
communicative agency. Lobbying and PR then are newly and increas-
ingly important topics for understanding the creation and delivery of 
social policy.
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Note
1. This section draws on research conducted for Powerbase (www.power-
base.info) – a collaborative project in which the authors are involved by 
Mary Craig, Kerri Park and in particular Kyle McCallum, whom we 
acknowledge.
References
Academy of Medical Sciences (2004) Calling Time: The Nation’s Drinking as a 
Major Health Issue. London: Academy of Medical Sciences.
Advertising Association, British Hospitality Association, British Retail 
Consortium, Food and Drink Federation, Incorporated Society of Brit-
ish Advertisers, National Farmers Union (2004) ‘Briefing Note 14 May 
2004: Joint Multi-Media Consumer Information Programme on Food 
and Health’, released under Freedom of Information Act, received 2 April 
2009 [online]. [http://www.powerbase.info/images/9/98/14.05_brief-
ing_note.word95.doc], accessed 5 April 2009.
Anderson, P. and Baumberg, B. (2006) ‘Alcohol in Europe: A Report for the 
European Commission’. Institute of Alcohol Studies.
Associate Parliamentary Health Group (2010) ‘Associate Members’ [http://
www.healthinparliament.org.uk/associate_members.html], accessed 15 
May 2010.
Babor, T. et al. (2003) Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity. Research and Public 
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baggott, B. (2006) ‘Alcohol Strategy and the Drinks Industry: A Partnership for 
Prevention? York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. [http://www.jrf.org.uk/
publications/alcohol-strategy-and-drinks-industry-partnership-preven-
tion], accessed 22 April 2009.
BBC News (2006) ‘Profile: Alan Milburn’ [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_
politics/5356016.stm], accessed 8 May 2010.
BBC News (2009) ‘Industry Drive to Curb Drinking’, 15 July [http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8152721.stm], accessed 10 January 2010.
Beaglehole, R. and Bonita, R. (2009) ‘Alcohol: A Global Health Priority’, The 
Lancet 373(9682) (26 June): 2173–4. [http://www.thelancet.com/series/
alcohol-and-global-health], accessed 27 June 2009.
Benady, D. (2008) ‘Pitfalls of Public Sector Marketing’, Marketing Week 17 
September [http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/home/pitfalls-of-public-
sector-marketing/2062459.article], accessed 24 May 2009.
Brownell, K. D. and Warner, K. E. (2009) ‘The Perils of Ignoring History: 
Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar is Big Food?’, 
The Milbank Quarterly 87(1): 259–94.
 M I L L E R  &  H A R K I N S — C O R P O R A T E  S T R A T E G Y  21
Business4Life (n.d.) ‘b4l in action’ [http://www.business4life.co.uk/b4linac-
tion/], accessed 22 April 2010.
Cabinet Office (2004) Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England. Prime Min-
ister’s Strategy Unit. [http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetof-
fice/strategy/assets/caboffce%20alcoholhar.pdf], accessed 22 July 2009.
Cartnell, M. (2008) ‘Freud Lands Anti-obesity Brief’, PR Week 1 August 
[http://www.prweek.com/news/rss/835807/Freud-lands-anti-obesity-
brief/], accessed 10 May 2010.
Centre for Civil Society (n.d.) ‘What is Civil Society?’ [http://www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm], accessed 22 April 2010.
Confessore, N. (2003) ‘Meet the Press: How James Glassman Reinvented 
Journalism – as Lobbying’, Washington Monthly December [http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.confessore.html], accessed 
July 2008.
Cooper, B. (2008) ‘Food Industry at Heart of New Anti-obesity Drive’, Just 
Food 20 November [http://www.just-food.com/article.aspx?id=104522], 
accessed 23 March 2009.
Crouch, C. (2004) Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Department of Health (2004) Choosing Health: Making Healthy Choices Easier. 
London: The Stationery Office.
Department of Health (2008) Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives: A Cross-
Government Strategy for England. Cross-Government Obesity Unit, Depart-
ment of Health. [http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_082378], accessed 
23 March 2010.
Donaldson, L. (2008) ‘150 Years of the Annual Report of the Chief Medical 
Officer: On the State of Public Health 2008’ [www.dh.gov.uk/prod_con-
sum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_096231.
pdf], accessed 22 March 2010.
Drinkaware Trust (2009) ‘Drinkaware Appoints Chief Medical Adviser’ 
[http://www.drinkaware.co.uk/media/press-releases/2009-press-release-
archive/drinkaware-appoints-chief-medical-adviser], accessed 15 Febru-
ary 2010.
Drinkaware Trust (2010a) ‘About Us’ [http://www.drinkaware.co.uk/about 
us], accessed 15 February 2010.
Drinkaware Trust (2010b) ‘Donations to Date’, 2007–2009 [http://www.
drinkaware.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/11912/fundersanddona-
tions2007–09.pdf], accessed 15 February 2010.
Drinkaware Trust (2010c) ‘Alcohol in the UK’ [http://www.drinkaware.
co.uk/alcohol-and-you/alcohol-in-the-uk], accessed 15 February 2010.
eConsultant (n.d.) ‘Ask the eConsultant’ [http://www.econsultant.com/arti-
cles/sugar-content-of-cola-pop-soda-drinks.html], accessed 7 May 2010.
Edwards, M. (2005) ‘Civil Society’, in The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education 
[www.infed.org/association/civil_society.htm], accessed 12 May 2010.
22 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 0 ( 4 )
Eurocare (2007) ‘Eurocare and Members to Join the EC’s Alcohol and Health 
Forum’, Press Release, 7 June [http://www.eurocare.org/press/eurocare_
press_releases/eurocare_and_members_to_join_the_ec_s_alcohol_and_
health_forum], accessed 3 July 2009.
Farey-Jones, D. (2009) ‘Matthew Freud Takes Stake in M&C Saatchi 
after Share Price Drop’, Brand Republic News Release, 26 February, 
Media Week [http://www.mediaweek.co.uk/news/883946/Matthew-Freud-
takes-stake-M-C-Saatchi-share-price-drop/], accessed 22 April 2009.
Farnsworth, K. (2004) Corporate Power and Social Policy in a Global Economy. 
Bristol: Policy Press.
Farnsworth, K. (2006) ‘Capital to the Rescue? New Labour’s Business 
Solutions to Old Welfare Problems’, Critical Social Policy 26(4): 
817–42.
Farnsworth, K. and Holden, C. (2006) ‘The Business-Social Policy Nexus: 
Corporate Power and Corporate Inputs into Social Policy’, Journal of Social 
Policy 35(3): 473–94.
Ferriman, A. (1999) ‘An End to Health Scares?’, British Medical Journal 319: 
716. [http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7211/716?ijKey=d05
bd96bb40a116823f810f8cdc39a5b1d1e2f10&keytype2=tf_ipsecsha], 
accessed 1 May 2010.
Food Standards Agency (FSA) (n.d.) ‘Traffic Light Labelling’ [http://www.
eatwell.gov.uk/foodlabels/trafficlights/], accessed 10 May 2010.
Food Standards Agency (2010) ‘Our Board’ [http://www.foodstandards.gov.
uk/aboutus/ourboard/], accessed 10 May 2010.
Freud Communications (2010) ‘Our Clients’ [http://www.freud.com/], 
accessed 23 March 2010.
Gillard, M. (2008) ‘MPs “Conned” Over Obesity Charity that Was Front for 
Diet Firm Trust that Used Public Cash to Influence the War on Fat is 
to Close after Revealing Links with Weight-loss Company’, Independent 
on Sunday 20 January [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
mps-conned-over-obesity-charity-that-was-front-for-diet-firm-771266.
html], accessed 10 April 2010.
Griffin, K. (2009) ‘Matthew Freud Buys Stake in M&C Saatchi’, The Telegraph 
25 February [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/medi-
atechnologyandtelecoms/media/4802011/Matthew-Freud-buys-stake-
in-MandC-Saatchi.html], accessed 10 May 2010.
Habermas, J. (1984) Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Vol. 1 of The 
Theory of Communicative Action, English trans. T. McCarthy. Boston: Bea-
con Press. (Originally published in German in 1981.)
Habermas, J. (1987) Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Vol. 
2 of The Theory of Communicative Action, English trans. T. McCarthy. 
Boston: Beacon Press. (Originally published in German in 1981.)
 M I L L E R  &  H A R K I N S — C O R P O R A T E  S T R A T E G Y  23
Harkins, C. (2010) ‘The Portman Group’, British Medical Journal 340: b5659 
[http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/340/jan20_1/b5659], accessed 20 
January 2010.
Harris, J. (2008) ‘Inside the Court of London’s Golden Couple’, The Guardian 
13 November [http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/nov/13/elisa-
beth-murdoch-matthew-freud-politics], accessed 10 May 2010.
Hastings, G. and Angus, K. (2009) ‘Under the Influence: The Damaging 
Effects of Alcohol Marketing on Young People’, British Medical Journal 
report [http://www.bma.org.uk/health_promotion_ethics/alcohol/under-
theinfluence.jsp], accessed 20 January 2010.
Hawkes, C. (2006) ‘Uneven Dietary Development: Linking the Policies and 
Processes of Globalization with the Nutrition Transition, Obesity and 
Diet-related Chronic Diseases’, Globalization and Health 2(4) [http://
www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/4].
Hencke, D. and Evans, R. (2009) ‘Tory Peer Accused of Misusing Lords to 
Boost her own Firm: Baroness Admits Listing of Interests Not “Punc-
tilious”. Pressure Group Spinwatch Lodges Complaint’, The Guardian 29 
January [http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jan/28/conservative-
peer-lady-cumberlege-finances], accessed 23 March 2010.
Hickman, M. (2010) ‘Parents Furious over “Hypocrisy” of Cereal Ad: Kel-
logg’s Accused of Pushing Coco Pops While Backing Obesity Cam-
paign’, Independent 1 February [http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
health-and-families/health-news/parents-furious-over-hypocrisy-of-
cereal-ad-1885164.html], accessed 2 February 2010.
Holden, C. and Lee, K. (2009) ‘Corporate Power and Social Policy: The Polit-
ical Economy of the Transnational Tobacco Companies’, Global Social 
Policy 9: 328–5.
Hyland, A., Wakefield, M., Higbee, C., Szczypka, G. and Cummings, K. M. 
(2006) ‘Anti-Tobacco Television Advertising and Indicators of Smoking 
Cessation in Adults: A Cohort Study’, Health Education Research 21(3): 
348–54.
Kooiman, J. (1999) Modern Governance. London: SAGE.
Krimsky, S. (1995) Science in the Private Interest. New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield.
Leys, C. (2001) Market-driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public 
Interest. London: Verso.
M&C Saatchi (2010) ‘75m DoH Anti-Obesity Account’ [http://www.
mcsaatchi.com/news_article.php?id=162].
McChesney, R. W. (2008) The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, 
Emerging Dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review Press.
McGarrity, T. and Wagner, W. (2008) Bending Science: How Special Interests 
Corrupt Public Health Research. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
24 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 0 ( 4 )
Marriott, H. (2007) ‘Philip Gould Takes Freuds Position’, PR Week 17 
January [http://www.prweek.com/news/rss/626648/Philip-Gould-takes-
Freuds-position/], accessed 4 May 2010.
Meier, P., Purshouse, R., Meng, Y., Rafia, R. and Brennan, A. (2009) ‘Model-
based Appraisal of Alcohol Minimum Pricing and Off-Licensed Trade 
Discount Bans in Scotland: A Scottish Adaptation of the Sheffield Alcohol 
Policy’, School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield. 
[www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/09/24131201/0], accessed 19 
November 2009.
Michaels, D. (2008) Doubt is their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science 
Threatens Your Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miller, D. and De Andrade, M. (2010) ‘Independent Research Body or PR 
Agency for Corporations? The Social Issues Research Centre’, British Med-
ical Journal 340: c484 [http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/bmj.c484?i
jkey=1anjS6jf2p2ikRP&keytype=ref#REF18], accessed 1 May 2010.
Miller, D. and Dinan, W. (2008) A Century of Spin. London: Pluto.
Miller, D. and Dinan, W. (2009) ‘Journalism, Public Relations and Spin’, 
pp. 250–64 in K. Wahl-Jorgensen and T. Hanitzsch (eds) Handbook of 
Journalism Studies. New York: Routledge.
Miller, D. and Mooney, G. (2010) ‘Introduction to the Themed Issue. Corpo-
rate Power: Agency, Communication, Influence and Social Policy’, Criti-
cal Social Policy 30(4).
Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D. (eds) (2009) The Road from Mont Pelerin: The 
Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Mooney, C. (2006) The Republican War on Science. New York: Basic Books.
Munro, G. (2004) ‘An Addiction Agency’s Collaboration with the Drinks 
Industry: Moo Joose as a Case Study’, Addiction 99(11): 1370–4.
Nestle, M. (2003) Food Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Nicholson, D. (2009) NHS Chief Executive’s Annual Report 2009. London: 
Department of Health. [http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/
groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_099700.pdf], 
accessed 23 March 2010.
Nielsen (2008) ‘Range of Data on Alcohol Sales by Volume, Liquor Category, 
Trade Sector, Per Capita, Retail Sales Value, and the Price of Alcohol Per 
Unit / Per Litre’, Scottish Government, 17 June [http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/Topics/Health/health/Alcohol/resources/nielson-data], accessed 
15 August 2009.
PepsiCo (2010a) ‘Didier Drogba of Chelsea Promoting Pepsi Max’ [http://
www.pepsi.co.uk/], accessed 22 April 2010.
PepsiCo (2010b) ‘Frank Lampard, the Face of Pepsi’s Play4Life Campaign’ 
[http://www.pepsi.co.uk/], accessed 22 April 2010.
 M I L L E R  &  H A R K I N S — C O R P O R A T E  S T R A T E G Y  25
Powerbase (2010) ‘Catherine Windels’ [http://www.powerbase.info/index.
php?title=Catherine_Windels], accessed 12 May 2010.
Quainton, D. (2006) ‘Analysis: Food Lobby Forced onto the Defensive’, PR 
Week 9 March [http://www.prweek.com/uk/home/article/545452/], 
accessed 23 March 2006.
Register of Lords’ Interests (2010) [http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldreg/reg10.htm], accessed 4 May 2010.
Rehm, J. et al. (2004) ‘Alcohol Use’, pp. 959–1108 in M. Ezzati, A. D. Lopez, 
A. Rodgers and C. J. L. Murray (eds) Comparative Quantification of Health 
Risks: Global and Regional Burden of Disease Attributable to Selected Major 
Risk Factors, Vol. 1. Geneva: World Health Organisation.
Rhem, J. et al. (2009) ‘Global Burden of Disease and Injury and Economic 
Cost Attributable to Alcohol Use and Alcohol-Use Disorders’, The Lancet 
373(9682) (27 June): 2223–33 [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lan-
cet/article/PIIS0140–6736(09)60746–7/abstract], accessed 30 June 2009.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (2000) ‘Governance and Public Administration’, pp. 54–90 
in J. Pierre (ed.) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rowan, D. (2006) ‘Who’s Got the Muscle?’, The Times 25 March [http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8123–2100578,00.html], accessed 11 July 2007.
Ruane, S. (2010) ‘Corporate and Political Strategy in Relation to the Private 
Finance Initiative in the UK’, Critical Social Policy 30(4).
Scottish Government (2006) ‘Drinkaware Memorandum of Understanding’, 
Scottish Government Publications, 26 October [http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/Publications/2006/10/23132143/1], accessed 19 November 2007.
Sebrie, E. M. and Glantz, S. A. (2007) ‘Attempts to Undermine Tobacco Con-
trol: Tobacco Industry “Youth Smoking Prevention” Programs to Under-
mine Meaningful Tobacco Control in Latin America’, American Journal of 
Public Health 97: 1357–67.
Smith, D. (2007) ‘Letter from Deborah Smith, Head of Alcohol & Drug 
Misuse, 31st August 2006, to John Drummond, Chief Executive of the 
Scottish Grocers Federation’, obtained via Freedom of Information legis-
lation, August.
Vibert, F. (2006) The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of 
Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wakefield, M. et al. (2006) ‘Effect of Televised, Tobacco Company-funded 
Smoking Prevention Advertising on Youth Smoking-related Beliefs, Inten-
tions, and Behavior’, American Journal of Public Health 96(12): 2154–60.
Warner, K. E. (2006) ‘Tobacco Policy Research: Insights and Contributions 
to Public Health Policy’, pp. 3–86 in K. E. Warner (ed.) Tobacco Control 
Policy. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Wedel, J. (2009) The Shadow Elite. New York: Basic Books.
26 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 0 ( 4 )
Whitehall Pages (2008) ‘Change4Life: The Healthy Living Revolution Starts 
Here’ [http://www.whitehallpages.net/modules.php?op=modload&name
=News&file=article&sid=149246&topic=163&newlang=eng], accessed 
23 March 2009.
Wiist, W. (2010) The Bottom Line or Public Health: Tactics Corporations Use to 
Influence Health and Health Policy, and What We Can Do to Counter Them. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
World Health Organisation (WHO) (2004) ‘Global Strategy on Diet, Physi-
cal Activity and Health’. Geneva: WHO. [http://www.who.int/dietphys-
icalactivity/goals/en/index.html], accessed 30 June 2009.
  David Miller is Professor of Sociology in the School of Applied Social 
Sciences at the University of Strathclyde. He is co-author (with Will Dinan) of 
A Century of Spin (Pluto, 2008) and co-editor (with Neil Davidson and Patri-
cia McCafferty) of Neoliberal Scotland (Cambridge Scholars, 2010). Address: 
Department of Geography and Sociology, University of Strathclyde, Graham 
Hills Building, Richmond Street, Glasgow G1 1XN, Scotland. email: david-
miller@strath.ac.uk 
  Claire Harkins is a Doctoral Candidate in the School of Applied Social Sci-
ences at the University of Strathclyde. Her Doctoral research examines contem-
porary modes of governance, particularly in relation to alcohol and public health 
policy. She edits the Alcohol Portal at Powerbase (www.powerbase.info). 
